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THE STATE OF UTAH : 
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v. 
TODD R. VAIL : Case No. 20001001-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial judge erred in concluding that Mr. Vail opened the door to Det. Braley's 
opinion testimony on the truthfulness of the complainants. Parties can only invite the 
admission of otherwise inadmissible opinion testimony if they mislead the jury or if they 
themselves violate the ban on offering opinions on truthfulness. Here, defense counsel 
did not suggest that the police questioned the victims' credibility nor did he elicit an 
opinion on their truthfulness. He simply asked the police detective to identify factors in 
investigating allegations of sexual abuse. 
The trial judge further erred in ordering Mr. Vail to pay restitution for a crime for 
which he did not admit responsibility. The law required the trial judge to specifically 
determine whether Mr. Vail was admitting responsibility for abusing Brittany. In the 
absence of any inquiry into Mr. Vail's understanding and intentions, the trial judge 
plainly erred in imposing restitution. 
I. THE DEFENSE DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR FOR THE 
STATE TO PRESENT INADMISSIBLE OPINION 
EVIDENCE ON THE VICTIM'S TRUTHFULNESS 
The State does not contest that Det. Braley offered her opinion on the 
complainants' truthfulness. Rather, it claims that Mr. Vail opened the door to opinion 
testimony. Under no scenario did the defense invite the prosecutor to elicit inadmissible 
opinion evidence. The admission of that improper opinion testimony irreparably harmed 
the defense in this close credibility contest. 
A. Because the Defense Never Implied that Det 
Braley Doubted the Complainants' 
Truthfulness, Misled the Jury, or Elicited 
Opinion Testimony Itself, It Did Not Open the 
Door to Inadmissible Opinion Testimony 
The State asserts that it was entitled to admit Det. Braley's opinion on the 
complainants' truthfulness because defense counsel suggested "that Detective Braley 
personally questioned both victims' credibility because their disclosures of sexual abuse 
arose in the context of a divorce proceeding." State's Brief at 9. The cases the State cites 
hold that parties can open the door to the admission of opinion testimony if they falsely or 
misleadingly suggest that a witness doubts the credibility of other witnesses. State v. 
Baymon, 446 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1994) (false impression victim had been coached); State 
v. Metzger, 4 P.3d 901, 905-06 (Wyo. 2000) (false suggestion that expert doubted 
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victim's veracity). But, here, the defense made no such misimpressions. 
On cross-examination of Det. Braley, defense counsel did not even hint that Det. 
Braley doubted the complainants' truthfulness. Instead, he elicited some of the factors 
that the police consider in investigating abuse allegations: 
Q. You indicated that you've - well, you've obviously 
had a great deal of training in the area of child sexual abuse 
and detection, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you understand that there are factors that you 
also have to weigh in to determine whether a child has in fact 
been coached or is not telling something that may be true, 
correct? 
A. Okay, yes. 
Q. And certainly divorce situations could raise 
eyebrows in certain circumstances, can't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Families where the children would be siding with 
one parent as opposed to the other, and trying to gain favor 
with that parent? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Those are indicators from your training that would 
cause concern to any skilled investigator about the testimony; 
is that a fair statement? 
A. I would say that's a fair statement. 
Q. There are numerous other ones, too, correct? 
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A. Correct. 
Q. Including the age of the child, their experience, 
things like that? 
A. There's a lot of factors, yes. 
R. 161: 126 (Addendum A). 
As this examination shows, defense counsel never intimated that Det. Braley 
"personally questioned both victims' credibility." State's Brief at 9. Defense counsel's 
cross-examination may have implied that Det. Braley had not weighed the factors 
properly or that she was not a "skilled" investigator, but he never misled the jury into 
believing that Det. Braley doubted the complainants' truthfulness. If anything, the fact 
that Det. Braley pursued the charges even though the allegations arose in a divorce 
context suggested that Det. Braley believed the complainants even though there was 
cause for suspicion. Defense counsel did not open the door to the admission of 
inadmissible opinion evidence. Baymon, 446 S.E.2d at 4; Metzger, 4 P.3d at 905-06. 
Parties can also open the door to opinion evidence on truthfulness if they 
themselves violate the ban on offering such opinions. State ex rel. E.D.. 876 P.2d 397, 
402 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Such violations occur when a party elicits a "subjective 
credibility determination." State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, ^ [13. 5 P.3d 642. But, as the 
excerpt quoted above demonstrates, defense counsel never elicited a subjective opinion 
from Det. Braley of any kind. Because the defense adhered to the rules of evidence, the 
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State lacked any opportunity to present Det. Braley's opinions. 
Further contrary to the State's implications, challenging the credibility of 
witnesses or offering motives for witnesses to lie do not open the door to opinion 
evidence on truthfulness. State v. Maurer. 488 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
In State v. Cam 725 P.2d 1287, 1288-89 (Or. 1986), for example, the defendant's step-
daughter accused the defendant of sexual abuse. The allegations arose after the defendant 
and his wife accepted a new religion which promoted both parents disciplining their 
children, rather than only the mother, as the parents had done previously. Id. at 1289. 
The mother testified that the step-daughter and her sister "rebelled" following the 
implementation of this discipline regimen, thus, implying that the girls had fabricated the 
abuse allegations. Id The prosecution responded by presenting an aunt's testimony that 
the step-daughter was honest and would not lie. Ld. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled 
that in credibility cases such as sexual assault matters testimony "suggesting that another 
witness is lying" or has a motive to fabricate does not open the door to opinion evidence 
on truthfulness. Id. at 1291. 
Similarly, in State v. Webb. 828 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Mont. 1992), a police informant 
claimed that the defendant had purchased drugs from him. On cross-examination, 
defense counsel extensively cross-examined the informant about his drug usage, 
including on the night of the alleged purchase. IdL at 1356. The Montana Supreme Court 
ruled that "neither contradictory evidence nor extensive cross-examination constitutes an 
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attack upon a witness' character for truth and veracity." Id It added, that "to conclude 
otherwise would result in admitting opinion testimony regarding veracity in virtually 
every case." Id. Defense counsel's challenging of Brittany's credibility and raising the 
possibility that she had been coached no more invited opinion testimony on truthfulness 
than did the cross-examinations in Carr and Webb. 
Both this Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's rulings are fully consistent with 
these decisions. This Court unequivocally concluded in State v. Adams. 955 P.2d 781, 
786 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), that a police officer had "improperly testified" about the 
alleged victim's truthfulness even though the defense "assert[ed] its theory that [the 
alleged victim] had been coached." On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court did not 
fault the defense for presenting its theory, and, in fact, agreed that the police officer's 
opinion testimony "violated rule 608(a) and that this error should have been obvious to 
the trial court." State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, ^ |20, 5 P.3d 642. Likewise, in State v. 
Stefaniak. 900 P.2d 1094, 1095-96 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court acknowledged the 
defense theory of fabrication based on rancorous divorce proceedings but, nevertheless, 
ruled that the State had erroneously elicited opinion testimony. 
The State dismisses these cases as dicta. State's Brief at 12-13. To the contrary, 
just as in Adams and Stefaniak, because the defense did not misleadingly suggest that 
Det. Braley doubted the complainants' truthfulness nor did it violate the ban on opinion 
testimony itself, it did not open the door to the admission of opinion testimony. 
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B. A More Favorable Verdict Was Likely Had the 
Trial Judge Properly Excluded the 
Inadmissible Opinion Testimony 
Despite the State's protestations, the erroneous admission of Det. Braley's opinion 
seriously undermines confidence in the jury's verdict. This Court has consistently ruled 
that the admission of vouching evidence has a prejudicial effect on juries in sexual assault 
cases involving close credibility determinations that arise during divorce proceedings. 
Stefaniak. 900 P.2d at 1096; State v. Iorg. 801 P.2d 938, 941-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Reversal is required when, as here, credibility is determinative because there is no other 
evidence to support the conviction. Iorg, 801 P.2d at 942. 
The State asserts that Mr. Vail's statements alone were sufficient to support the 
conviction. State's Brief at 14. To the contrary, Mr. Vail adamantly denied ever 
touching Brittany or Kirstyn in a sexual manner and testified to that fact at trial. R. 161: 
120-23; 162: 218; Addendum A. The fact that Mr. Vail claimed that Kirstyn was 
"touchy" and would lay on him when giving him hugs does not support the allegations 
that he sexually assaulted her. In fact, those admissions are consistent with Mr. Vail's 
claims that he hugged the girls but never touched them sexually. Likewise, the showering 
and bathing may have conflicted with social norms but did not constitute crimes. Neither 
of the girls ever alleged that anything of sexual nature ever occurred while in the shower 
or during a bath. Moreover, the girls never alleged that Mr. Vail ever exposed them to 
pornography. These activities were completely separate and unrelated to the girls' 
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allegations. 
The State similarly fails in its attempts to show that the divorce proceedings 
provided no motive for the girls to lie. Both the girls and the grandmother harbored ill 
feelings toward Mr. Vail. Brittany testified that she disliked Mr. Vail for disciplining her 
and for his behavior toward Tracy. R. 161: 112-13. The grandmother openly admitted 
that she resented Mr. Vail because she believed that he deprived her of contact with her 
daughter and granddaughters. Moreover, the grandmother and the girls likely begrudged 
Mr. Vail because Tracy had removed the girls from her home while she and Mr. Vail 
attempted to reconcile. This decision sent the obvious message that Tracy valued Mr. 
Vail more than her own mother and daughters. 
The State makes much of fact the allegations arose after Tracy announced that she 
and Mr. Vail were divorcing. State's Brief at 15-16. The timing of the announcement 
supports rather than undermines the defense theory that the grandmother and the girls 
falsely accused Mr. Vail. Out of loyalty to, respect for, or love of Tracy, the grandmother 
and the girls may not have wanted to interfere with Tracy's and Mr. Vail's efforts to 
resolve their marital difficulties. Tracy's decision to remove the girls from her home may 
have also raised doubts about Tracy's loyalty to them. It should not be forgotten that 
Tracy delayed a few weeks before informing her mother and daughters of her decision to 
leave Mr. Vail. R. 161: 187. But, once Tracy chose her girls over Mr. Vail, the 
grandmother and the girls were reassured that Tracy cared for them more than Mr. Vail. 
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The announcement of the divorce was an ideal time for the grandmother and the girls to 
exact revenge and to ensure that Tracy did not waiver on her decision to choose her own 
family over Mr. Vail. The fact that the allegations arose on the same day that Tracy 
announced her decision confirms these inferences. 
The grandmother had another obvious motive to fabricate. Although custody was 
not at issue in the divorce, visitation rights remained to be addressed. The grandmother 
admitted that her main complaint against Mr. Vail was her diminished opportunity to see 
her granddaughters. By accusing Mr. Vail of sexually assaulting her granddaughters, the 
grandmother could ensure that Tracy did not reconcile with Mr. Vail and that she would 
see her family when she wanted. 
Despite the State's efforts to show that Det. Braley's opinion did not influence the 
jury's deliberations, the opposite is true. In the first place, it should be remembered that 
the jury was hung rather than unanimous on the charge involving Brittany. Because only 
one juror is needed to stymie a jury, this Court cannot infer that the jury as a whole 
discredited Det. Braley's opinion testimony in reaching its verdict as the State would have 
this Court believe. State's Brief at 16. 
To the contrary, Det. Braley's expert-like opinion appears to have been decisive in 
the jury's deliberations. Although the State correctly asserts that the prosecutor did not 
mention Det. Braley during closing arguments, State's Brief at 16, the prosecutor's entire 
theme centered on her assertion that the complainants "were telling the truth." R. 162: 
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230-34. Thus, the girls' credibility was the linchpin to the State's case. 
Det. Braley's testimony directly addressed the complainants' credibility. The 
prosecutor elicited that Det. Braley had investigated over 1500 instances of child abuse 
and had interviewed more than 1000 child victims. Based on this extensive experience, 
the jury certainly weighed her testimony heavily. As one court observed, "the testimony 
of a police officer qualified as an expert on the investigation of sexual assault cases would 
likely carry exceptional weight and an aura of reliability which could lead the jury to 
abdicate its role in determining [the complainant's] credibility." Matter of G.M.P., 909 
S.W.2d 198, 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). 
Rather than the jury disregarding Det. Braley's testimony in reaching its mixed 
verdicts as the State proposes, the record indicates that weaknesses in Brittany's 
testimony caused the jury to hang. Numerous problems plagued Brittany's testimony 
including her repeatedly faulty memory and indications that she was looking for 
assistance from others during her testimony. R. 161:88-94, 102-06. Although Kirstyn 
also remembered few details about the allegations, her memory lapses were not as 
pervasive and she did not look for guidance during her testimony. As the jury's verdict 
indicates, she was a better witness than Brittany. 
The key inquiry for this appeal is whether a different verdict is likely after 
excluding Det. Braley's authoritative opinion. Separating Det. Braley's testimony leaves 
behind a close credibility contest that arose where both the complainants and the 
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grandmother had significant incentives to fabricate. "Given the lack of real or physical 
evidence, the jury's determination as to the credibility of the witnesses likely was the 
determinative factor in its verdict." State v. Carr. 725 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Or. 1986). 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. Vail's convictions. Id. 
IL THE SENTENCING JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING 
RESTITUTION WITHOUT ESTABLISHING THAT MR. 
VAIL HAD ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ASSAULTING BRITTANY 
In imposing restitution for Brittany, the sentencing judge failed to follow 
established law. The sentencing judge never inquired about whether Mr. Vail was 
admitting responsibility for a crime of which he was not convicted. Because the 
sentencing judge plainly erred, this Court should reverse the restitution order. 
Again, the State misconstrues the law in its analysis of this issue. The sentencing 
judge did not "firmly establish^], much like a guilty plea,11 that Mr. Vail admitted 
responsibility for abusing Brittany before imposing restitution. State v. Watson, 1999, 
UT App 273, TJ5, 987 P.2d 1289; Addendum B. As the State's analysis demonstrates, 
numerous inferences are necessary to even reach the conclusion that the sentencing judge 
"implicitly" found that Mr. Vail admitted responsibility. State's Brief at 18-19. 
This Court rejected similar reasoning in Watson. The defendant there pleaded 
guilty to attempted obstruction of justice for her role in a homicide. 1999 UT App 273, 
11 
Tf2, 987 P.2d 1289. Specifically, she drove the perpetrators to and from the crime scene 
and then sold the car used in the crime. Id. Although the defendant only admitted to 
obstructing justice, the sentencing judge ordered her to pay restitution for the death of the 
victim. Id. at ffl[2, 5. This Court ruled that because the sentencing judge could not 
conclude that the defendant had admitted responsibility for the death "[w]ithout making 
inferences,... there was no firmly established admission of responsibility upon which to 
order . . . restitution.f! Id at [^5. 
Just as in Watson, the sentencing judge below had to make numerous inferences to 
conclude that Mr. Vail admitted responsibility. Mr. Vail's failure to object to the 
presentence report and his vague apologies at sentencing did not constitute a "firmly 
established admission" because he never stated for what he was apologizing. Id. Only by 
making inferences could the sentencing judge, who had not presided at trial, conclude that 
Mr. Vail had agreed to pay restitution. Watson forbids such conduct. 
The State argues that State v. Simonette, 881 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
supports the sentencing judge's restitution order. In the first place, that case is of 
marginal relevance because it was decided five years before Watson. In any event, 
Simonette is readily distinguishable from this case because the defendant in that case 
explicitly "admitted" in a presentence diagnostic evaluation that he committed an 
uncharged offense. 881 P.2d at 964. In contrast, Mr. Vail never admitted to abusing 
Brittany either in the presentence report or at sentencing. 
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This Court's holding in Watson seems to contemplate avoiding the very ambiguity 
that occurred here. As the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated, ,f[t]he need for 
evidentiary reliability in sentencing proceedings is greater when specific factual issues 
must be resolved." State v. Hammond. 2001 UT 92, f20, P.3d (internal 
quotations omitted). Because the sentencing judge failed to inquire about Mr. Vail's 
understanding, the judge lacked authority to impose restitutions payments to Brittany. 
The State protests that the sentencing judge did not plainly err in imposing 
restitution because although "the rule of law may have been obvious to the trial court, it 
would not have been obvious to the trial court that defendant was not admitting 
responsibility for sexually abusing both girls." State's Brief at 20. The State 
misunderstands the plain error doctrine. An error is obvious, when the "law was clear at 
the time of trial." State v. Garcia. 2001 UT App 19,1fl8, 18 P.3d 1123. Watson plainly 
requires sentencing judges to unambiguously determine that criminal defendants admit 
responsibility for crimes before imposing restitution. 
In essence, the State argues that any error in imposing restitution was not obvious 
to the sentencing judge because Mr. Vail did not object to the imposition of restitution. 
This reasoning turns the plain error doctrine on its head. Under the State's approach, the 
plain error doctrine is rendered meaningless because parties can only obtain relief, 
regardless of established law and notions of fairness, if they specifically preserve all 
issues. 
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To avoid such injustice, the plain error doctrine requires trial judges to know the 
law and to enforce it. See, e.g.. State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); Garcia, 
2001 UT 19, TI18, 18 P.3d 1123. Placing the burden on judges sidesteps unfairly 
punishing criminal defendants for not knowing their rights and for relying on the 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939-40. Because the sentencing 
judge failed to apply well-settled law in imposing restitution, reversal is required. 
Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1J6, 987 P.2d 1289. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial judge erroneously admitted opinion evidence that severely 
prejudiced the defense and erroneously imposed restitution, this Court should reverse Mr. 
Vail's convictions and remand this case for a new trial with instructions to eliminate the 
restitution order with respect to Brittany. 
Submitted, this 31st day of October, 2001. 
feNT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
place? 
A. 
Q. 
whether 
A. 
part of 
Q. 
August? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
problems 
A. 
-120-
Do you remember the date that that interview took 
August 20th of 1999. 
All right. At the time of interview did he indicate 
or not he and Tracy Ely were still living together? 
I believe at this time they had split up the first 
August of 1999. 
All right, and this was about the third week of j 
Correct. 
And did you talk to him regarding that split at all? 1 
I did. 
Did he indicate anything regarding what kind of 
they were having in the marriage? 
That they were having communication problems. He made 
a reference to a sexual problem. 1 
Q. 
go on tc 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
contact 
Q. 
Okay. After you got past the initial stuff, did you J 
specifically ask him about the allegations? 
I did. 
And what was his response to your inquiry? 
He denied ever having any sexual feelings or sexual 
with the girls. J 
Okay. Now, we heard Brittney testify about this 
showering with the defendant. 
A. Yes. 
-121-
1 J Q. Did you ask him about that? 
2 A. I did, 
3 Q. Did you have that information from the girls? 
4 A. I did. 
5 
6 Q. Okay. What was his response to your questions about 
7 showering? 
8 A. He indicated he had showered with the girls. 
9 Q. Okay. Did he indicate how often he had done that? 
10 A. I believe he said quite often. 
11 Q. All right, and did he indicate if Tracy ever showered 
12 with the gir}.s? 
13 A. He did not. 
14 Q. Okay. Did he indicate how old the girls were when he 
15 was in the habit of showering with them? 
16 A. We discussed that Brittney was up to the age of 11 and 
17 Kirsten was 7 or 8. 
18 Q. Did he give you an explanation as to why that was 
19 necessary? 
20 A. To conserve time in the evenings. 
21 Q. All right. 
22 A. To teach them how to wash. 
23 Q. All right. Did he indicate that he had taken baths 
24 with them as well? 
25 A. Yes. 
-122-
1 Q. What did he say about that? 
2 A. That the bath time was a bonus. They would just sit 
3 in the bath and talk and relax. 
4 Q. And when he was saying "they," who was he referring 
5 to? 
6 A. He and Kirsten and Brittney. 
7 Q. And this was at one bath time altogether? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Okay. Going back to the showering a little bit, did 
10 you ask him whether or not there was anything sexual involved 
11 with that? 
12 A. We did talk about that, yes. 
13 Q. What was his response initially? 
14 A. No, that there was nothing sexual about it. 
15 Q. All right. Did you ask him any further questions 
16 about that? 
17 A. I did. 
18 Q. What did you ask him? 
19 A. Just in reference to what Tracy had told me, that she 
20 had wanted to stop and he — because she had mentioned that he 
21 had become aroused. 
22 Q. Uh-huh. Did he indicate that that conversation did in 
23 fact take place? 
24 A. Yes, 
25 Q. And did he indicate to you what his feelings were 
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about showering? 
A. 
to have 
Brittney 
Q. 
He indicated that he had become aroused, he had began 
man feelings, and they decided not to shower with 
anymore. 
Okay. So the man feelings were related to Brittney 
specifically? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
allegati 
alleged, 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
and that 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And did he indicate why with Brittney? 
She had started to mature. 
Okay. When she was 11? 1 
Yes. 
Now, specifically regarding the facts of Kirsten's 
ons, you ultimately went over exactly what she had 
right? 
Correct. f 
And did he have any specific response to those facts? 
He indicated that Kirsten was a physical touchy child, 
had laid upon him. J 
Okay, in what way laid upon him? 1 
Laid on top of him. I 
Okay, and what about Brittney, did you talk to him 
specifically about the allegations that Brittney had made? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
About being in bed together? 
Yes. 
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1 Q. Did he have anything in response to that? 
2 A. Just that it was common for Brittney to be — to lay 
3 between he and Tracy. 
4 Q. Okay. Based on the interview and on the information 
5 that you gathered, did you make a decision about what to do 
6 with the case? 
7 A. I did. I felt that it needed to be presented in front 
8 of the district attorney's office, and we did that. 
9 Q. Okay, and a filing decision was made at that point? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 MS. BARTON: No further questions. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. You may cross examine, 
13 Mr. Skordas. 
14 MR. SKORDAS: Thank you. 
15 CROSS EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. SKORDAS: 
17 Q. You present a lot of cases to the district attorneys, 
18 don't you? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. In fact, that's your job, isn't it? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. To gather evidence and present the case? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And you say you've done that for about 1500 cases? 
25 A. Probably about that, yes. 
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1 Q. Pardon me? 
2 A. I think that's about right. 
3 Q. Including at least 1000 children that you interviewed? 
4 A. I would say so. 
5 Q. You understand the importance of making an interview 
6 non-leading, I think were your words; is that correct? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. You don't want to put words in a child's mouth, 
9 correct? 
10 A. Right. 
11 Q. You weren't present during the interview between the 
12 children and their grandmother, were you? 
13 A. No, I was not. 
14 Q. And you don't know whether she's had any training in 
15 how to interview a child such that it's not leading, correct? 
16 A. Correct. 
17 Q. And did you interview her about that? 
18 A. We talked about what she'd asked, yes. 
19 Q. Okay, and did you talk to the kids about what they had 
20 told their grandmother? 
21 A. I believe so, yes. 
22 Q. And certainly the grandmother's mode of question was 
23 more leading than you would have done through your training, 
24 correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
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Q. You indicated that you've — well, you've obviously 
had a great deal of training in the area of child sexual abuse 
and detection, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you understand that there are factors that you 
also have to weigh in to determine whether a child has in fact 
been coached or is not telling something that may be true, 
correct? 
A. Okay, yes. 
Q. And certainly divorce situations could raise eyebrows 
in certain circumstances, can't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Families where the children would be siding with one 
parent as opposed to the other, and trying to gain favor with 
that parent? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Those are indicators from your training that would 
cause concern to any skilled investigator about the testimony; 1 
is that a fair statement? 1 
A. I would say that's a fair statement. 1 
Q. There are numerous other ones, too, correct? 1 
A. Correct. 1 
Q. Including the age of the child, their experience, 1 
things like that? I 
A. There's a lot of factors, yes. 
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All right, and you indicated that Mr. Vail came in 
was asked by you to meet with himf correct? 
Correct. 
He was cooperative? 
Yes, he was. 
And you gave him a Miranda warning before you talked 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I suppose that's a routine thing that you do when 
you interview people? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he waived those rights, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Talked to you about the problems that he was having 
with his wife? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That included some communication problem and some 
sexual problems? 
A. Correct. 
Q. His statement to you was transcribed. Do you happen 
to have a copy of that with you? 
A. I do. 
Q. Okay. Would you turn to page 8 of his statement, 
specifically starting on line 303. 
A. Okay. 
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1 I thinks it's an issue that this child never mentioned that she 
2 was wearing a knee-length nightgown. I'm just trying to bring 
3 out the fact that in fact she did. He was alleging a prior 
4 inconsistent statement, and hearsay is admissible if I'm using 
5 this evidence to simply rebut that. 
6 THE COURT: Very good. It's overruled. You may go 
7 ahead. 
8 Q. BY MS. BARTON: Read the statement of the social worker 
9 on page — on line 140. 
10 A. It says, "Only like a nightshirt kind, not a nightgown 
11 to your knees." "And you had underwear on, okay. So you saw 
12 him lick his fingers or did you hear him lick his fingers — " 
13 Q. Okay, that's — thank you. Mr. Skordas has asked you 
14 a couple of questions about indicators that you worked for when 
15 — to tell whether a child is fabricating something or making 
16 something up. What about indicators that the child is telling 
17 the truth? What kind of indicators do you look for there? 
18 A. Body language, consistency. 
19 Q. Were you looking for these indicators with those 
20 girls? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Did you find them? 
23 MR. SKORDAS: Your Honor, I'm going to object. This 
24 witness can't — 
25 MS. BARTON: Your Honor, he opened the door. He's 
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of these 
Barton. 
credibility 
THE COURT: Well, no. 
MR. SKORDAS: That is exactly what she just said. 
THE COURT: Maybe I better hear from Ms. Barton. 
MS. BARTON: Yes, your Honor. On cross examination 
Mr. Skordas asked her if she detected any indicators that 
would in his view indicate lack of trustworthiness, and I'm 
now asking her if she found indicators that would show a 
likelihood of honesty. It's a topic that he opened. 
THE COURT: Overruled, you may ask. 
Q. BY MS. BARTON: Did you see those indicators in this 
case? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Now, Mr. Skordas also asked you about taking lots of 
cases to the district attorney's office. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are there some cases that you never take? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would your reasons for that be? 
MR. SKORDAS: I guess I'll just continue my objection 
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THE COURT: Overruled. She may continue. 
BY MS. BARTON: Why would you not take a 
district attorney/s office? 
case to 
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the 
A. If changing statements or evidence that shows there is 
enough not to bring the case forward. 
MS. BARTON: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: You may cross examine, Mr. Skordas. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SKORDAS: 
Q. You don't make the decision on whether to file 
charges, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. That's made by someone at the district attorney's 
office, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or by others, correct? 
A. (Inaudible), yes. 
Q. You're a fact gathering person for the most part, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. SKORDAS: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anything? 
MS. BARTON: Just one, one question on that topic. 
/// 
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Defendant pled guilty in the Third District, Salt 
Lake Department, Tyrone E. Medley, J., to 
attempted obstruction of justice for having sold car 
used in murder and was ordered to pay restitution. 
Defendant appealed restitution order. The Court of 
Appeals held that defendant was not required to pay 
restitution, absent admission of responsibility for 
murder or agreement to pay restitution. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>2130 
350Hk2130 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2)) 
[1] Sentencing and Punishment <@^2138 
350Hk2138 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2)) 
[1] Sentencing and Punishment <®==>2143 
350Hk2143 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2)) 
Defendant who pled guilty to attempted obstruction 
of justice but did not admit responsibility for murder 
nor agree to pay restitution was not required to pay 
restitution to Victim's Reparation Fund for money it 
gave to murder victim 's family for counseling. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(4)(a)(i). 
[2] Sentencing and Punishment <®=^ 2100 
350Hk2100 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2)) 
Restitution statute does not ask the trial court to 
analyze a defendant's state of mind but, rather, asks 
it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing 
court. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim 
Page 2 
[3] Sentencing and Punishment <®^2130 
350Hk2130 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 11 Ok 1208.4(2)) 
Restitution statute requires that responsibility for 
defendant's criminal conduct be firmly established, 
much like a guilty plea, before the court can order 
restitution. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). 
•1290 David C. Cundick, Parker, Freestone, 
Angerhofer, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., James H. Beadles, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Vincent Meister, Deputy Dist. 
Atty., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., BENCH, 
and BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
^ 1 Ellie Watson appeals the trial court's order 
requiring her to pay restitution to the Victim's 
Reparation Fund for money it gave to a murder 
victim's family for counseling. The State concedes 
error. We reverse. 
f 2 On July 23, 1996, Lonnie Durazo was killed 
and Melissa Fraga was injured. Watson was 
charged with criminal homicide and attempted 
criminal homicide because she allegedly drove 
codefendants, Quetzalcohual Chapman and Mike 
Pierson, to and from the crime scene. Watson was 
also charged with obstruction of justice for having 
sold the car used in the crime. Under a plea 
bargain, Watson pleaded guilty to attempted 
obstruction of justice. She was sentenced and 
ordered, over her objection, "to pay restitution in 
such amount (sic) as have been made of the Victim's 
Reparation' (sic) Fund relating to the death of 
Lonnie Durazo." 
[1] K 3 A court may order restitution only if the 
defendant has been convicted of a crime that 
resulted in pecuniary damages and agrees to pay 
restitution or admits to the criminal conduct. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- 201(4)(a)(i)(Supp.l999) 
(stating "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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court shall order that the defendant make restitution 
to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or 
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to 
make restitution as part of a plea agreement"). 
"Criminal activities" is defined as "any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without 
an admission of committing the criminal conduct." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- 201(l)(b)(Supp.l999). 
H 4 The trial court focused on the phrase "criminal 
conduct for which the defendant admits" in the 
"criminal activities" definition, in determining that 
restitution was appropriate: 
This court is of the opinion that for 76-3-201(b) 
and again focusing on that language "any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to." In this court's opinion the 
defendant did admit to the responsibility of driving 
this vehicle. And in this court's opinion also, 
[defense counsel], in spite of the fact that you 
maintain that some of the facts are disputed, I am 
just of the opinion that there are sufficient facts, 
substantial as they may be, which are reflective of 
the defendant's state of mind in this particular 
case; i.e., hearing the shots, individuals running 
towards the vehicle, her admission that she drove 
the vehicle away. In this court's opinion is 
sufficient nexus to hold her accountable for 
restitution in this particular case and meets the 
statutory definition. And even when you apply 
the "but for" analysis to that conduct, in this 
court's view, she still qualifies to have restitution 
imposed. For those reasons, I am going to 
require that the defendant, Ms. Watson, make 
restitution in this particular case. 
[2] [3] H 5 To conclude that Watson admitted 
responsibility for the murder and that there was a 
sufficient nexus to hold her accountable to the 
victim's family for restitution, the trial court 
examined and made inferences about Watson's state 
of mind based upon the evidence before it. 
However, the statute is more narrow. It does not 
ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of 
mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made 
to the sentencing court. In other words, the statute 
requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct 
be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, 
before the court can order restitution. See, e.g., 
State v. Voetberg, 99 Or.App. 112, 781 P.2d 387 
(1989) (interpreting a restitution statute similar to 
Utah's). In Voetberg, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
determined that the trial court should not have 
ordered the defendant, who admitted the company's 
liability in his capacity as president, to pay 
restitution because he did not admit personal liability 
and he was not determined to be the alter ego of the 
*1291 company. See 781 P.2d at 388-89. The 
court concluded that a trial court must insure that 
formalities of an admission are met before 
restitution can be ordered: 
For the purposes of determining the basis for 
restitution, the admission of a defendant is 
essentially the same as a plea of guilty that would 
support a conviction, but a judgment of conviction 
is not entered because of a plea bargain. Because 
such an admission can result in liability for 
substantial sums of money, defendant's 
responsibility for the criminal activities ought to be 
firmly established. 
Id. at 389 (citation omitted). The same rationale 
applies here. Without making inferences as the 
trial court did, it cannot be said that Watson 
admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she 
agree to pay restitution. Watson only admitted and 
pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge for 
which there were no pecuniary damages. Thus, 
there was no firmly established admission of 
responsibility upon which to order Watson to pay 
restitution. 
f 6 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order 
of restitution and remand the case for such further 
proceedings as may now be proper. 
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